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Mentalising, also known as ‘Theory of Mind’, is the ability to understand and infer the 
cognitions of others, such as their perceptions, intentions, and beliefs. Although several tools 
have been designed to measure mentalising in adults, there exist methodological and practical 
limitations. Many of the existing measures conflate mentalising with similar constructs (e.g., 
empathy), and most are lengthy measures that are unsuitable for large population-based 
studies and clinical practice. These issues are currently hampering clinical and non-clinical 
investigations into mentalising and related social-cognitive abilities. Drawing on 
questionnaire measures of social cognition, we conceived a self-report mentalising scale, the 
Four-Item Mentalising Index (FIMI; Studies 1a & b). The FIMI was developed through a 
series of studies examining its factor structure and reliability (Studies 2a & b) and by testing 
its construct validity against a cognitive mentalising task, autistic traits, and comparing scores 
in autistic and non-autistic people (Studies 3a & b). Together, we demonstrate that the FIMI 
is a conceptually and methodologically robust tool for measuring mentalising ability in the 
general population, including autistic and non-autistic people. Future research directions and 
practical (clinical) applications of the scale are discussed, with a focus on improving 
understanding and management of (a)typical mentalising ability.  
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Public Significance Statement: We developed a reliable questionnaire to measure how well 
people understand what others are thinking. It was validated against an objective test and by 
giving the questionnaire to autistic people who are known to have difficulties understanding 
others. We discuss how this tool will be useful in future large-scale studies and clinical 
practice. 




‘Mentalising’ or ‘Theory of Mind’ is the social-cognitive ability to understand and infer the 
mental states of oneself and others, including beliefs, intentions, and desires (see Happé et al., 
2017). A large body of research has examined mentalising in children, but less research has 
explored mentalising in adulthood (Livingston & Happé, in press). Investigating mentalising 
in adulthood is critically important to understand social-cognitive changes in our aging 
population (Henry et al., 2013) and clinical phenomena, such as autism, which are 
characterised by mentalising difficulties (e.g., Lever & Geurts, 2016).  
There has been a growing interest in this field, with several measures being designed 
to examine mentalising in typical and atypical adults. These include cognitive tasks that 
involve inferring character’s mental states from vignettes (e.g., Happé, 1994), animations 
(e.g., White et al., 2011), videos (e.g., Murray et al., 2017), and images of the eye region 
(e.g., Olderbak et al., 2015). However, practical issues with these measures, such as their 
complexity and administration time, limit their use in many research and clinical settings, 
thereby constraining current understanding of (a)typical mentalising across the lifespan. For 
example, the widely used Frith-Happé Animations Task requires presentation of several 
videos followed by recording, transcription, and coding of participants’ responses, which is 
not possible in certain research designs or clinical practice (see Livingston, Carr et al., 2019). 
 There are also concerns about the validity of existing measures; they often have poor 
or untested psychometric properties and concerns have been raised about whether they are 
truly measuring mentalising or other social-cognitive processes such as emotion processing 
(see Olderbak et al., 2019). Accordingly, recent research has found poor associations between 
self-report and cognitive measures of social cognition (e.g., empathy; Murphy & Lilienfeld, 
2019), as well as relatively low correlations between different mentalising tasks (Morrison et 
al., 2019; Warnell & Redcay, 2019; Navarro et al., in press). This is likely because these 
measures are combining and conflating several constructs, including mentalising, emotion 




perception, and empathy (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). Nonetheless, by carefully 
distinguishing between social-cognitive constructs in questionnaires and simplifying their 
conceptual complexity (see McGrath, 2005), we suggest that it is possible to develop self-
report mentalising measures and improve their use in applied settings (e.g., in clinical 
practice).   
In view of these practical, methodological, and conceptual issues in previous research, 
researchers and clinicians would benefit from the development of a short, valid, and easily 
administered self-report measure of mentalising. Beyond its practical importance, such a 
measure also has potential to advance our theoretical understanding of mentalising, 
particularly informing debates about its (non)overlap with related psychological constructs. 
To this end, we aimed to develop and validate the Four-Item Mentalising Index (FIMI). 
Drawing on questionnaire measures of social cognition and using factor analysis, we selected 
items for the FIMI (Studies 1a & b), followed by examination of its factor structure, 
measurement invariance by sex, internal consistency, and test-retest reliability (Studies 2a & 
b). Finally, we examined its validity against a cognitive mentalising task, autistic traits, and 
comparisons between autistic and non-autistic people (Studies 3a & b). 
Study 1: Conceptual Analysis and Item Selection 
We first drew upon items from the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy 
(QCAE; Reniers et al., 2011) to develop the FIMI, which combines several existing empathy 
scales. It has subscales measuring two types of empathy: affective (experiencing others’ 
emotional states) and cognitive (understanding others’ emotional states). Cognitive empathy 
and mentalising are sometimes considered interchangeable (e.g., Rueda et al., 2015), but 
evidence suggests these constructs, with different underlying neurobiological mechanisms 
(Preckel et al., 2018), are not equivalent. Such distinctions between cognitive empathy and 
mentalising are critically important for studying different social-cognitive processes, 




particularly in clinical populations (Olderbak et al., 2019). Indeed, when developing the 
QCAE, Reniers et al. (2011) noted that, “cognitive empathy is concerned with the attribution 
of emotions as opposed to cognitions, and as such the two constructs [mentalising and 
cognitive empathy] are potentially dissociable” (p.85). Accordingly, we propose that 
mentalising and cognitive empathy are related but separable constructs, whereby we define 
cognitive empathy as understanding of others’ emotions, whereas mentalising is the 
understanding of non-emotional mental states. Following this line of enquiry, a cursory 
inspection of the QCAE highlighted that some of its items were more closely aligned with the 
conceptual definition of mentalising than empathy. To confirm this observation, using 
emotional inference as the critical feature that distinguishes empathy from mentalising, we 
asked a panel to identify QCAE items that did not have emotion-related language and then 
conducted factor analyses to select mentalising items.  
Study 1a. The factorial structure of the QCAE has previously been examined (e.g., 
Reniers et al., 2011), but not for the purpose of excluding emotional and identifying 
mentalising items. Given the subtle differences in emotional language which may distinguish 
mentalising from cognitive empathy, it was unlikely that this distinction could solely be made 
through a data-driven approach. Therefore, following scale development procedures for 
interpreting text (Carpenter, 2018), non-emotional QCAE items were manually identified. 
Four raters—two authors and two independent experts—independently selected QCAE items 
that were free from emotion-related language. They reliably selected 9 items (Krippendorff’s 
α = .89) with minimal discrepancy, which was resolved through discussion until consensus. 
Items including emotional words (e.g., “feel”) were excluded, whereas items without 
emotional language were selected (Table 1).  
 We then analysed an existing dataset of an online study in which participants (N = 
660, 326 females, aged 18-85, Mage = 35.24, SDage = 12.02 years) had completed the QCAE as 




a measure of empathy (see Shah et al., 2019) using the standard 4-point response scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 2 = slightly disagree, 3 = slightly agree, 4 = strongly agree). Exploratory 
Factor Analysis (EFA), with principal axis factoring and Oblimin rotation, examined the 
structure underlying the 9 non-emotional QCAE items that had manually been identified.1 
This revealed 2 moderately correlated (r = .55) factors with initial SS loadings greater than 1 
(2.04 and 1.64; 41% total variance explained). Examination of the individual items (Table 1) 
suggested that 5 items in Factor 1 pertained to social cognition potentially involving but not 
directly measuring mentalising (e.g., “I am good at predicting what someone will do”), 
whereas the 4 items in Factor 2 clearly aligned with the conceptual definition of mentalising 
(e.g., “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective”). 
Further empirical support for the distinction between emotional and non-emotional 
QCAE items, as identified by the four raters, was sought using Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFA). This indicated that a 2-factor model, separating 9 non-emotional QCAE items from 
the 22 emotional items, showed significantly better fit than a 1-factor solution of 31 items, 
χ2difference (1) = 29.57, p < .001. Further, a 2-factor model, separating 4 potential mentalising 
items from the remaining 27 QCAE items, showed significantly better fit than a 1-factor 
solution, χ2difference (1) = 114.67, p < .001. Together, these results demonstrated that several 
 
1 Across studies, factor analyses were performed using the Psych (Revelle, 2018, v.1.8.12), 
GPA rotation (Bernaards & Jennrich, 2005, v.2014.11-1), Lavaan (Rosseel, 2012, v.0.6-3) 
and/or semTools (Jorgensen et al., 2018, v.0.5-1) packages in R. Models were estimated using 
the default maximum likelihood estimation in Lavaan. Because the QCAE/FIMI has a 4-point 
Likert scale, we supplemented all our main CFAs using an estimator for ordinal variables, 
which yielded the same conclusions (see Supplementary Materials). 




QCAE items were measuring a construct that was distinguishable from empathy, thereby 
supporting further investigation of their suitability for a mentalising scale.  
 
Study 1b. To address concerns with Study 1a – because it drew from an existing 
dataset of the full QCAE and other measures – we recruited a new sample of participants to 
complete an online study of just the 9 non-emotional items selected from the QCAE. This 
sample (N = 669) was recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) so that it was similar 
to Study 1a. English-speaking participants, recruited from the United States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK), reported their age and sex, demonstrating that the sample contained a wide 
age range of males and females (342 females, aged 18-80, Mage = 36.39, SDage = 12.14 years). 
There were no other inclusion or exclusion criteria, and there were no attention checks as the 
study was short in duration. All studies were approved by the local ethics committee, and 
participants gave informed consent and were debriefed following their participation. As this 
study sought to confirm the EFA results in Study 1a, response data were submitted to a CFA. 
This showed that a 2-factor solution, χ2 (26) = 95.42, p < .001; CFI = .95; TLI = .93; RMSEA 
= .06; SRMR = .04, was a better fit (χ2difference (1) = 166.94, p < .001) than a 1-factor solution, 
χ2 (27) = 262.37, p < .001; CFI = .84; TLI = .78; RMSEA = .11; SRMR = .07. This provided 
further evidence that items in Factor 2, i.e., 4 mentalising items, measured the same latent 
construct (Table 1). 
Study 2: Measure Development, Factor Structure, and Reliability 
We made two minor changes to the selected items before examining the internal 
consistency, factorial validity, and test-retest reliability of the new instrument (Studies 2a & 
b). First, the item “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of 
view” was changed to “I sometimes find it difficult to see things from other people’s point of 
view” for gender-neutral language. This was reverse worded/scored. Second, the item “I can 




usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I do not agree with it” was changed 
to “I can usually understand another person’s viewpoint, even if it differs from my own” to 
further reduce its emotional content without altering its intended meaning. The remaining 
items were unchanged, as was the 4-point response scale from Study 1. Together, these items 
formed the Four-Item Mentalising Index (FIMI; see Supplementary Material). 
Study 2a. The FIMI was completed online by a large community sample of 1,999 
English-speaking adults in the US and UK recruited through Mturk, followed by questions 
about their age and sex (1286 females, aged 18-80, Mage = 35.77, SDage = 12.82 years). There 
were no other inclusion or exclusion criteria, and there were no attention checks as the study 
was short in duration. This study was designed to enable i) Multi-group Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses (MCFA) by sex and ii) a well-powered examination of the link between age, sex, 
and FIMI scores. 
The FIMI had acceptable-to-good internal consistency (ω = .75). To confirm the 
unidimensional structure of the FIMI, we performed a CFA with all items loading onto 1 
factor, which showed that a 1-factor solution provided excellent fit (see Table 2). Further, 
MCFA tested measurement invariance of the FIMI by sex by comparing 4 models of 
invariance, each with increasing levels of equality constraint across groups. Configural 
invariance fit indices were within the critical range and there was a non-significant change 
between configural, metric, scalar, and strict invariance models in CFI (ΔCFI < .01; Table 3), 
thereby confirming that the FIMI is invariant to sex.  
Further examination of the data showed that each of the FIMI’s 4 items had similar 
levels of variance. Total scores, computed as the sum of the responses to the individual items, 
ranged between 4 and 16, with higher scores representing greater mentalising ability (see 
Table 4 for detailed descriptive statistics and Supplementary Table 1 for inter-item 
correlations). There was no statistically significant association between participant age and 




total FIMI scores (r = -.01, p = .80), but females (M = 12.60, SD = 2.28) had significantly 
higher FIMI scores than males (M = 12.08, SD = 2.31), t(1453.58) = 4.44, p < .001, d = 0.21. 
Study 2b. Additionally, to determine the test-retest reliability of the FIMI, 116 
students (93 females, aged 18-20 years) completed the FIMI in their 1st (M = 12.91, SD = 
1.58) and 8th (M = 13.34, SD = 1.61) week at university through an online research 
participation scheme. FIMI scores were correlated between timepoints (r = .74, p < .001), 
indicative of acceptable-to-good test-retest reliability. Overall, Study 2 showed that the FIMI 
has a unidimensional factor structure, measures the same construct in males and females, and 
has acceptable-to-good reliability. 
Study 3: Construct Validity 
We examined the validity of the FIMI against two theoretically relevant and 
psychometrically robust measures: a cognitive mentalising task and a self-report measure of 
autistic traits (Study 3a). We then validated the FIMI in people who are known to have 
mentalising difficulties, that is, autistic people (Study 3b).  
Study 3a. We tested the relationship between the FIMI and a recently refined version 
of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMET; Olderbak et al., 2015), which requires 
matching images of the eye region depicting various mental states with one of 4 mental state 
words. Importantly, this version offers improved validity and reliability to the original task, 
thereby mitigating potential concerns with its use. We also tested the association between the 
FIMI and the 28-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ28; Hoekstra et al., 2011), a widely 
used measure of autistic traits. We expected that the FIMI would be positively associated 
with RMET performance, but negatively associated with autistic traits given that mentalising 
ability is lower in people with many autistic traits (e.g., Livingston, Carr et al., 2019).  
Five hundred English-speaking participants (254 females, aged 18-78, Mage = 37.29, 
SDage = 11.74 years), recruited from the US and the UK through Mturk, completed the FIMI 




(ω = .76), RMET (ω = .79), and AQ28 (ω = .78) in a counterbalanced order, followed by 
questions about their age and sex. Thirty-four additional participants were excluded because 
they completed the study twice or failed a simple attention check. As expected, the FIMI was 
correlated positively with RMET performance (r = .35, p < .001) and negatively with the 
AQ28 (r = -.43, p < .001), particularly its socially relevant subscales (Supplementary Table 
2). Females had higher FIMI and RMET scores than male participants, and there was a 
significant association between age and RMET performance but not age and FIMI scores (see 
Supplementary Table 3 for descriptives and intercorrelations). Most importantly, we 
confirmed that the FIMI significantly predicted RMET performance when controlling for age, 
sex, and AQ28 scores (Table 5). Furthermore, a CFA re-confirmed that the FIMI has a 
unidimensional factor structure (Table 2). 
Study 3b. To further validate the FIMI, we tested whether autistic adults scored lower 
on the FIMI compared to a non-autistic control group, as should be expected based on 
previous research (Livingston, Carr et al., 2019). Autistic participants were recruited through 
the Wales Autism Research Centre, the National Autistic Society, and Autistica’s Discover 
Network, and non-autistic participants were recruited through Prolific. Participants were 102 
adults (62 females, aged 18-68, Mage = 41.74, SDage = 12.15 years) with a confirmed clinical 
diagnosis of autism from a UK healthcare professional (e.g., Psychiatrist) and 183 non-
autistic individuals (101 females, aged 18-73, Mage = 40.04, SDage = 11.76 years) who were 
also from the UK. Groups were matched by age, sex, and general mental ability. As measured 
by the 10-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ10; Allison et al., 2012), the autistic group (M 
= 8.02, SD = 1.96) had more autistic traits than the non-autistic group (M = 2.64, SD = 1.42), 
t(161.59) = 24.43, p < .001, d = 3.15 (see Supplementary Table 4). 
All participants completed the FIMI and, as expected, scores were significantly lower 
in autistic (M = 9.56, SD = 2.69; ω = 0.73) than non-autistic (M = 12.57, SD = 2.09; ω = 0.79) 




participants, t(169.88) = 9.78, p < .001, d = 1.25. Similarly, there was a negative association 
between the FIMI and AQ10 across groups, r = -.57, p < .001, and within the autistic group, r 
= -.38 p < .001. Replicating the CFA from Study 2a and 3a, the FIMI had a unidimensional 
factor structure (Table 2). To assess the appropriateness of our groupwise comparisons and 
the FIMI’s use in future autism research, we tested if the FIMI measures the same construct 
in autistic and non-autistic people using MCFA. This confirmed that the FIMI was invariant 
to autism at the configural, metric, and scalar level, as evidenced by a non-significant change 
in CFI (ΔCFI < .01; Table 3). Overall, Study 3 supported the FIMI’s validity, given its 
associations with i) an existing measure of mentalising, ii) autistic traits in the general 
population, and iii) clinically diagnosed autism. 
Discussion 
In view of ongoing concerns regarding the conceptual clarity and psychometric 
validity of existing measures of social cognition (Murphy & Lilienfeld, 2019; Olderbak et al., 
2019; Quesque & Rossetti, 2020), we developed the FIMI to selectively measure mentalising 
ability without it being conflated with other social-cognitive constructs (e.g., empathy), 
which was possible given our approach to carefully selecting mentalising items for the FIMI 
(Study 1). This was supported by our analyses showing that the FIMI has a robust 
unidimensional factor structure and acceptable-to-good internal consistency (Study 2a) and 
test-retest reliability (Study 2b).  
In developing the FIMI, we have neither shown nor claim that mentalising is entirely 
separable from other social and non-social cognitive constructs. Indeed, mentalising, 
empathy, and domain-general cognitive processes, like executive function, are likely to be 
in(ter)dependant (Happé et al., 2017). The FIMI should help to further our understanding of 
these relationships by facilitating future research on quantifying the extent of the overlap (or 
lack thereof) between these constructs, and therefore it has potential to contribute to several 




domains of psychological science. Similarly, because we showed that the FIMI measures the 
same construct in males and females, its future use will also help to address outstanding 
questions on sex differences in social cognition and behaviour, particularly in clinical groups 
with atypical social cognition and uneven sex ratios (e.g., autism, Loomes et al., 2017; social 
anxiety disorder, Asher et al., 2017). More generally, there has been surprisingly little 
analysis of sex-based measurement invariance of mentalising and other social-cognition 
measures, which, as reported in the present study, will be useful to conduct in future research. 
A potential limitation of short measures, like the FIMI, is their proneness to 
measurement error if they are not carefully designed (see Ziegler et al., 2014). 
Encouragingly, however, the FIMI’s internal consistency was acceptable-to-good, in both 
autistic and non-autistic people, and we found a satisfactory range of scores for a short 
measure, even within the autistic group (Table 4). Further, Study 3 helped to assuage 
concerns about the FIMI’s reliability and validity. Because the FIMI was significantly 
associated with performance on an existing measure of mentalising ability, even when 
accounting for age, sex, and autistic traits, we report strong evidence that it is capturing 
meaningful individual differences in mentalising. It is particularly noteworthy that the FIMI 
was more strongly associated with the refined RMET than a well-established measure of 
autistic traits that has long been associated with performance on the RMET and other 
mentalising tasks (i.e., Table 5; see Olderbak et al., 2015). Together, these results indicate 
that, despite its brevity, the FIMI is well designed to quantify individual differences in 
mentalising. 
Our findings also indicate that adults have insight into their social-cognitive 
processing, thereby addressing recent concerns that social-cognitive abilities may not be 
measured through self-report scales (e.g., Murphy & Lilienfeld, 2019). The development of 
the FIMI and Study 3’s results showing a link between self-report and objective measures of 




mentalising, will contribute to and prompt further investigation into this important, under-
researched topic. This will not be straightforward as there are ongoing debates about the 
validity of many cognitive and experimental measures of social cognition (e.g., Livingston, 
Carr et al., 2019; Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). It will be difficult to investigate people’s 
insight into their social cognition while it remains unclear exactly which processes are 
measured in experimental cognitive tasks (e.g., Santiesteban et al., 2015). By using the FIMI, 
it will be possible to reliably measure ‘subjective’ mentalising ability, which may feed into 
refining ‘objective’ cognitive measures of mentalising. This process will particularly benefit 
from psychometric analyses, as conducted in the present study, which are often missing in 
social cognition research (see Olderbak et al., 2019). The FIMI therefore could complement 
rather than replace cognitive measures of social cognition, which, in turn, will serve to 
improve both self-report and cognitive measures of mentalising. 
The use of the FIMI in clinically relevant research and practice was supported by 
Study 3, which also demonstrated support for the construct validity of the FIMI. That is, we 
found clear associations between the FIMI and autism. Indeed, the effect size of the 
difference between autistic and non-autistic people was larger than recent studies using 
cognitive measures of mentalising in autism (e.g., Murray et al., 2017). These results are 
consistent with longstanding theory and empirical reports of autism-related mentalising 
difficulties (e.g., Livingston, Carr et al., 2019). Importantly, we also showed that the FIMI is 
invariant to autism, thereby supporting its use to measure and/or compare mentalising in 
autistic and non-autistic people. An association between autistic traits and the FIMI within the 
autistic group also suggests that the FIMI potentially measures clinically meaningful 
mentalising differences. Although finding autism-related mentalising difficulties may not 
seem particularly novel, Study 3b is the first to quantify self-reported mentalising difficulties 
in autism and the first using an instrument that has formally been shown to be invariant to 




autism. Together, Study 3 provides validation for the FIMI and fresh support for theories 
about atypical mentalising in autism. 
Moving forward, the FIMI may be useful to gain insight into autistic people’s internal 
experiences and thereby inform diagnosis and social support interventions. In particular, the 
FIMI may be critical for understanding social difficulties in autistic people who use 
compensatory strategies, which many existing social-cognitive tasks seem unable to capture 
(see Livingston, Shah et al., 2019). Given its brevity, the FIMI may also have utility in time-
restricted clinical settings. Although the FIMI is shown to be suitable for use in autistic 
people, further investigation will be required in other clinical groups where atypical 
mentalising has been reported (e.g., social anxiety disorder). More broadly, the FIMI may 
prove useful in large-scale studies, including online and/or population-based studies, towards 
addressing important questions about developmental trajectories, genetic underpinnings, and 
individual differences pertaining to (a)typical mentalising (see Livingston & Happé, in press). 
A limitation of the current study is that we only explored age- and sex- related mentalising 
differences while developing the FIMI. However, given the FIMI’s brevity, it will be feasible 
to use it in future large-scale studies to address outstanding questions on other socio-
demographic predictors of mentalising (e.g., socioeconomic status; Pluck et al., in press).   
Summary & Conclusion 
In summary, we report the development and validation of the FIMI, the first self-
report measure of mentalising. To develop this measure, we drew from an existing self-report 
measure of social cognition to derive 4 items putatively measuring mentalising ability (Study 
1). Following changes to these items to construct the FIMI, we demonstrated its internal 
consistency, unidimensional factor structure, invariance to participant sex, and test-retest 
reliability (Study 2). Finally, we confirmed relationships between the FIMI and existing 
measures of mentalising and autism, suggesting it has good construct validity (Study 3). 




Together, our studies show that the FIMI is a conceptually and psychometrically robust 
measure of mentalising, suitable for use in autistic and non-autistic adults. The FIMI will help 
to address limitations in previous mentalising research and is likely to be useful for clinicians 
interested in (a)typical social cognition.  
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Table 1. Factor Loadings for Non-emotional Items of the QCAE (Studies 1a and 1b). 










I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a 
conversation (15) 
.58 .10 .67 -- 
I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but 
means another (16) 
.72 -.10 .62 -- 
I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person 
does not tell me (24) 
.57 .09 .56 -- 
I can easily work out what another person might want 
to talk about (25) 
.67 .05 .65 -- 
I am good at predicting what someone will do (27) .56 .00 .69 -- 
I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s 
shoes (18) 
.04 .73 -- .69 
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the 
“other guy’s” point of view (1, Reversed) 
-.12 .65 -- .48 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better 
by imagining how things look from their 
perspective (4) 
.13 .57 -- .59 
I can usually appreciate the other person’s 
viewpoint, even if I do not agree with it (28) 
.06 .51 -- .66 
Note. Potential mentalising items are presented in bold font (note the wording is amended for 
the FIMI, see Table 2). QCAE: Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy; EFA: 
Exploratory Factor Analysis; CFA: Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Original QCAE item 
numbers are in parentheses.  
 
  




Table 2. Factor Loadings for the FIMI Items Across Studies using Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFAs) of a Single-Factor Model.  
Note. All CFAs indicated that the FIMI had a unidimensional factor structure, with excellent 
fit indices across all the studies (Study 2a: χ2 (2) = 8.41, p = .015; CFI > .99; TLI = .99; 
RMSEA = .04; SRMR= .01; Study 3a: χ2 (2) = 9.50, p = .009; CFI = .99, TLI = .96, RMSEA 
= .09, SRMR = .03; Study 3b: χ2 (2) = 2.72, p = .26; CFI > .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .04, 










1. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes .80 .79 .79 
2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from other 
people’s point of view (Reversed) 
.60 .45 .77 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 
imagining how things look from their perspective 
.60 .72 .62 
4. I can usually understand another person’s viewpoint, 
even if it differs from my own  
.60 .69 .73 




Table 3. Measurement Invariance of the FIMI by Sex (Study 2a) and Autism (Study 3b). 
  χ² df Δχ² CFI ΔCFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Sex  Configural 9.29 4  >.99  .99 .04 .01 
 Metric 10.95 7 1.66 >.99 <.01 >.99 .02 .01 
 Scalar 12.74 10 1.79 >.99 <.01 >.99 .02 .02 
 Strict 19.51 14 6.77 >.99 <-.01 >.99 .02 .02 
Autism Configural 13.84 4  .97  .90 .13 .03 
 Metric 18.57 7 4.73 .96 <-.01 .93 .11 .05 
 Scalar 24.10 10 5.53 .95 <-.01 .94 .10 .05 
 Strict 94.39 14 70.30 .71 <-.24 .76 .20 .12 
Note: χ²: chi-square goodness of fit test; df: degrees of freedom; CFI: Comparative Fit Index; 
TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA: Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation; SRMR: 
Standardised Root Mean Squared Residual. Strict invariance, which tests equivalence of 
residuals between groups, was neither expected nor obtained given the generally higher level 
of variance typically found in autistic compared to non-autistic groups. 
 
  



































Variance 5.29 2.50 2.59 5.79 7.46 7.22 4.37 
SD 2.30 1.58 1.61 2.41 2.73 2.69 2.09 
Range 12 8 7 12 12 12 12 































Median 12 13 13 12 12 10 12 
MAD 
Robust 
2.97 1.48 1.48 1.48 2.97 2.97 1.48 
Note. SD: Standard Deviation; IQR: Interquartile Range; MAD: Median Absolute Deviation. 
Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
 
  




Table 5. Multiple Regression Analysis of the FIMI, AQ28, Age, and Sex Predicting RMET 
Performance (Study 3a). 
 RMET 
Predictors B SE B β t p sr2 
95% BCa CI 
Lower Upper 
FIMI .34 .05 .30 6.55 <.001 .07 0.24 0.44 
AQ28 (Autistic Traits) -.02 .01 -.05 -1.15 .25 .00 -0.04 0.01 
Age .04 .01 .18 4.46 <.001 .03 0.03 0.06 
Sex  -.49 .23 -.09 -2.16 .031 .01 -0.94 -0.05 
Note. Overall Model: F(4, 495) = 24.71, p < .001, R2 = .17. Sex is coded as Males = 1, 
Females = 0. 95% Bias corrected and accelerated bootstrapped confidence intervals (95% 
BCa CI) are reported. RMET: Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; FIMI: Four-Item 
Mentalising Index; AQ28: 28-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient. 
  






Clutterbuck, R. A., Callan, M. J., Taylor, E. C., Livingston, L. A., & Shah, P. Development 
and validation of the Four-Item Mentalising Index (FIMI). Psychological Assessment. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) using Weighted Least Square Mean and Variance 
adjusted (WLSMV) estimation 
Repeating CFAs in Study 1a data using WLSMV revealed an almost identical pattern of 
results as those using Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. Separating 9 non-emotional 
from 22 emotional (χ2difference (1) = 57.74, p < .001), and 4 mentalising from 27 remaining 
QCAE items (χ2difference (1) = 126.24, p < .001) in two-factor models had significantly better 
fit than a unifactorial model of all QCAE 31 items. All other repeated CFAs with WLSMV 
estimation produced similar results to ML, in terms of factor loadings, model fit indices, and 
measurement invariance across Studies 1-3 (see Supplementary Tables 5-7). 
  




Supplementary Table 1 
 Inter-item Correlations of the Four-Item Mentalising Index (Study 2a). 
 M(SD) Skew Kurtosis Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q1. I find it easy to put myself in 
somebody else’s shoes 
3.13 
(0.78) 
-.71 .22 -    
Q2. I sometimes find it difficult to 
see things from other people’s point 
of view (Reversed) 
2.75 
(0.89) 
-.15 -.80 .49* -   
Q3. I sometimes try to understand 
my friends better by imagining how 
things look from their perspective 
3.30 
(0.70) 
-.87 .83 .48* .33* -  
Q4. I can usually understand another 
person’s viewpoint, even if it differs 
from my own 
3.21 
(0.69) 
-.62 .43 .47* .36* .38* - 
Note. *p < .001   




Supplementary Table 2 
Correlations Between the FIMI and AQ28 Subscales (Study 3a). 
Measure M(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. FIMI 12.25(2.41) -      
2. AQ28 Total 65.27(9.10) -.43** -     
AQ28 Subscales        
3. Social Skills 19.20(4.84) -.22** .79** -    
4. Routine 7.48(1.82) -.16** .48** .41** -   
5. Switching 8.91(2.06) -.22** .61** .46** .32** -  
6. Imagination 16.55(3.77) -.59** .66** .31** .17** .31** - 
7. Numbers & 
Patterns 
13.14(3.36) .05 .19** -.15* -.20** -.15** -.06 
Note. Pearson’s r values presented. AQ28: 28-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient. FIMI: Four-
Item Mentalising Index. *p < .05, **p < .001. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting 
this analysis, which follows recent research on divergent contributions of autistic traits to social 
cognition (Taylor et al., 2019). 
  




Supplementary Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations (Study 3a). 
Measure M(SD) 1 2 3 4 5 
1. AQ28 65.27 (9.10) -     
2. RMET 6.33 (2.76) -.20** -    
3. FIMI 12.25 (2.41) -.43** .35** -   
4. Age 37.29 (11.74) -.07 .22** .08 -  
5. Sex 0.49 (0.50) .05 -.14* -.10* -.09* - 
Note. Pearson’s r values presented. AQ28: 28-item Autism-Spectrum Quotient. RMET: 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. FIMI: Four-Item Mentalising Index. Sex is coded as Males 
= 1, Females = 0. *p < .05, **p < .001. 
 
  




Supplementary Table 4  
Participant Characteristics and Matching of the Autistic and Non-Autistic Groups (Study 3b). 
Note. General Mental Ability was quantified using the International Cognitive Ability 
Resource, which has previously demonstrated concurrent validity with in-person assessments 
(see Condon & Revelle, 2014). Cohen’s d was interpreted as 0.2 = small, 0.5 = medium, and 
0.8 = large effects. Phi Φ is interpreted as 0.1 = small, 0.3 = medium, and 0.5 = large effects. 
 
Autistic  
(n = 102) 
Non-Autistic  
(n = 183) Range Group Difference 
 M(SD) M(SD) 
Age 41.74(12.15) 40.04(11.76) 18–73 
t (203.29) = 1.14, p = .25, 
d = 0.14 
General Mental 
Ability 
9.02(3.77) 8.58(3.07) 4–16 
t (175.99) = 1.01, p = .31, 
d = 0.13 
n Male, Female 40, 62 82, 101  
χ2(1) = 0.84, p = .36, 
Φ = 0.05 




Supplementary Table 5 
Factor Loadings for Non-emotional Items of the QCAE (Study 1b) using Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) with WLSMV Estimation of a Two-Factor Model. 
 Note. Potential mentalising items are presented in bold font (note the wording is amended for 
the FIMI, see Supplementary Table 5). QCAE: Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective 
Empathy. Original QCAE item numbers are shown in parentheses. CFA with WLSMV 
estimation showed that a 2-factor solution, χ2 (26) = 126.02, p < .001; CFI = .96; TLI = .95; 
RMSEA = .08; SRMR = .05, was a better fit (χ2difference(1) = 120.35, p < .001) than a 1-factor 







I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation (15) .72 -- 
I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another (16) .68 -- 
I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person does not tell me 
(24) 
.65 -- 
I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about (25) .72 -- 
I am good at predicting what someone will do (27) .77 -- 
I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes (18) -- .76 
I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” 
point of view (1, Reversed) 
-- .49 
I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how 
things look from their perspective (4) 
-- .67 
I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I do 
not agree with it (28) 
-- .77 




Supplementary Table 6 
Factor Loadings for the FIMI Items Across Studies using Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
(CFAs) with WLSMV Estimation of a Single-Factor Model.  
Note. Study 2a: χ2 (2) = 11.13, p = .004; CFI > .99, TLI = .99, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .01; 
Study 3a: χ2 (2) = 11.40, p = .003; CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .10 SRMR = .03; Study 











5. I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes .87 .87 .84 
6. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from other 
people’s point of view (Reversed) 
.65 .52 .83 
7. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by 
imagining how things look from their perspective 
.67 .79 .68 
8. I can usually understand another person’s viewpoint, 
even if it differs from my own  
.67 .75 .78 




Supplementary Table 7 
Measurement Invariance of the FIMI by Sex (Study 2a) and Autism (Study 3b) using WLSMV 
















Sex  Configural 12.71 4  >.99  .99 .05 .01 
 Equal 
Thresholds 







22.55 11 1.39 >.99 <.01 >.99 .03 .01 
Autism Configural 16.25 4  .98  .95 .15 .05 
 Equal 
Thresholds 





22.26 11 2.69 .99 <.01 .98 .09 .05 
Note. χ²: chi-square goodness of fit test; df: degrees of freedom; CFI: Comparative Fit Index; 
TLI: Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA: Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation; SRMR: 
Standardised Root Mean Squared Residual. The Δχ² represent scaled chi-squared differences 
following Satorra (2000). 
  





Condon, D. M., & Revelle, W. (2014). The International Cognitive Ability Resource: 
Development and initial validation of a public-domain measure. Intelligence, 43, 52-
64. 
Satorra, A. (2000). Scaled and adjusted restricted tests in multi-sample analysis of moment 
structures. In R. D. H. Heijmans, D. S. G.  Pollock, & A. Satorra (Eds.), Innovations 
in multivariate statistical analysis. A Festschrift for Heinz Neudecker (pp.233-247). 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
Svetina, D., Rutkowski, L., & Rutkowski, D. (2019). Multiple-group invariance with 
categorical outcomes using updated guidelines: an illustration using M plus and the 
Lavaan/semTools packages. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary 
Journal, 27(1), 111-130. 
Taylor, E. C., Livingston, L. A., Callan, M. J., & Shah, P. (2019). Divergent contributions of 
autistic traits to social psychological knowledge. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 116(51), 25378-25379. 
Wu, H., & Estabrook, R. (2016). Identification of confirmatory factor analysis models of 
different levels of invariance for ordered categorical outcomes. Psychometrika, 81(4), 
1014-1045. 
 
 
